Turkish Airlines - THY Türk Hava Yollari

Boeing 737-800

On November 21, 2019, a regular THY2UT flight en-route Istanbul – Odesa at B737-800 aircraft, nationality and registration mark TC-JGZ of the Turkish Airlines, was performed by the aircraft crew consisting of the Pilot-in-Command (PIC), co-pilot and four flight attendants of the aircraft. In fact, the departure from Istanbul Airport was performed at 17:33. The actual aircraft landing took place at 18:55. According to the flight plan, the alternate aerodromes were Istanbul and Chi<U+0219>inau. There were 136 passengers and 2793 kg of luggage on board the aircraft. The PIC was a Pilot Flying, and the co-pilot was a Pilot Monitoring of the aircraft. The pre-flight briefing of the crew, according to its explanations, was carried out before departure from the Istanbul Airport, after which the PIC took the decision to perform the flight. The climb and level flight were performed in the normal mode. The landing approach was performed to the Runway16 with ILS system at a significant crosswind component of variable directions. At the final stage of approaching with ILS to Runway 16, the ATC controller of the aerodrome control tower (ATC Tower) gave the aircraft crew a clearance for landing. The aircraft crew confirmed the controller’s clearance and continued the landing approach. Subsequently, from a height of about 50 meters, the aircraft performed a go-around due to the aircraft non-stabilization before landing. Following the go-around, the aircraft headed to the holding area to wait for favorable values of wind force and direction. At 18:45, the PIC took the decision to carry out a repeated landing approach, reported of that to the ATC controller, who provided ATS in the Odesa Terminal Maneuvering Area (TMA.) At 18:51, the crew re-contacted the Tower controller and received the clearance to land. At 18:55, after touchdown, during the runway run, the aircraft began to deviate to the left and veered off of the runway to the left onto the cleared and graded area. After 550 m run on the soil, the aircraft returned to the runway with its right main landing gear and nose part (while moving on the soil, the nose landing gear collapsed) and came to rest at the distance of 1612 m from the runway entrance threshold. The crew performed an emergency evacuation of passengers from the aircraft. As a result of the accident, the aircraft suffered a significant damage to the nose part of the fuselage and left engine. None of the passengers or crew members was injured.

Airbus A320

The aircraft departed Milan-Malpensa Airport at 0700LT and proceeded to the east. Following an uneventful flight, the crew initiated the approach to Istanbul-Atatürk Airport Runway 05. At a height of 100 feet above the runway, the aircraft banked to the right, stalled and struck the runway surface. On impact, the right main gear was severely damaged and punctured the right wing. In such condition, the captain decided to abandon the landing manoeuvre and initiated a go-around procedure. The aircraft climbed to an assigned altitude of 3,800 feet then the crew declared an emergency and confirmed that the right engine was out of service. Few minutes later, the right engine caught fire. The crew followed a 20-minutes holding circuit over the bay of Marmara before a second approach to runway 35L. After touchdown, the right main gear collapsed, the aircraft slid for few dozen metres then veered off runway to the right, completed a 180 turn before coming to rest in a grassy area. All 97 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. According to the operator, the loss of control during the last segment was caused by turbulences from a preceding Boeing 787 that landed on the same runway 05.

Airbus A330

The aircraft departed Istanbul at 1818LT on March 3 on a scheduled flight to Tribhuvan International Airport (TIA), Kathmandu with 11 crew members and 224 passengers .The aircraft started contacting Kathmandu Control from 00:02 hrs to 00:11hrs while the aircraft was under control of Varanasi and descending to FL 250 but there was no response because Kathmandu Control was not yet in operation. The airport opened at its scheduled time of 00:15hrs. The aircraft established its first contact with Kathmandu Approach at 00:17 hrs and reported holding over Parsa at FL 270. Kathmandu Approach reported visibility 100 meters and airport status as closed. At 00:22 hrs the aircraft requested to proceed to Simara due to moderate turbulence. The Kathmandu Approach instructed the aircraft to descend to FL 210 and proceed to Simara and hold. At 01:05 hrs when Kathmandu Approach provided an updated visibility of 1000 meters and asked the flight crew of their intentions, the flight crew reported ready for RNAV (RNP) APCH for runway 02. The aircraft was given clearance to make an RNP AR APCH. At 01:23 hrs when the aircraft reported Dovan, Kathmandu Approach instructed the flight crew to contact Kathmandu Tower. Kathmandu Tower issued a landing clearance at 01:24 hrs and provided wind information of 100° at 03 knots. At 01:27 hrs the aircraft carried out a missed approach due to lack of visual reference. The aircraft was given clearance to proceed to RATAN hold via MANRI climbing to 10500 feet as per the missed approach procedure. During the missed approach the aircraft was instructed to contact Kathmandu Approach. At 01:43 hrs the aircraft requested the latest visibility to which Kathmandu Approach provided visibility 3000 m and Kathmandu Tower observation of 1000 meters towards the south east and few clouds at 1000 ft, SCT 2000 ft and BKN 10,000 feet. When the flight crew reported their intention to continue approach at 01:44 hrs, Kathmandu Approach cleared the aircraft for RNAV RNP APCH runway 02 and instructed to report RATAN. The aircraft reported crossing 6700 ft at 01:55 hrs to Kathmandu Tower. Kathmandu Tower cleared the aircraft to land and provided wind information of 160° at 04 kts. At 01:57 hrs Kathmandu Tower asked the aircraft if the runway was insight. The aircraft responded that they were not able to see the runway but were continuing the approach. The aircraft was at 880 ft AGL at that time. At 783 ft AGL the aircraft asked Kathmandu Tower if the approach lights were on. Kathmandu Tower informed the aircraft that the approach lights were on at full intensity. The auto-pilots remained coupled to the aircraft until 14 ft AGL, when it was disconnected, a flare was attempted. The maximum vertical acceleration recorded on the flight data recorder was approximately 2.7 G. The aircraft pitch at touchdown was 1.8 degree nose up up which is lower than a normal flare attitude for other landings. From physical evidence recorded on the runway and the GPS latitude and longitude coordinate data the aircraft touched down to the left of the runway centerline with the left hand main gear off the paved runway surface. The aircraft crossed taxiways E and D and came to a stop on the grass area between taxiway D and C with the heading of the aircraft on rest position being 345 degrees (North North West) and the position of the aircraft on rest position was at N 27° 41' 46", E 85° 21'29" At 02:00 hrs Kathmandu Tower asked if the aircraft had landed. The aircraft requested medical and fire assistance reporting its position at the end of the runway. At 02:03 hrs the aircraft requested for bridge and stairs to open the door and vacate passengers instead of evacuation. The fire and rescue team opened the left cabin door and requested the cabin attendant as well as to pilot through Kathmandu Tower to deploy the evacuation slides. At 02:10 hrs evacuation signal was given to disembark the passengers. All passengers were evacuated safely and later, the aircraft was declared as damaged beyond repair.

Boeing 737-800

Turkish Airlines Flight 1951, a Boeing 737-800, departed Istanbul-Atatürk International Airport (IST) for a flight to Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS), The Netherlands. The flight crew consisted of three pilots: a line training captain who occupied the left seat, a first officer under line training in the right seat and an additional first officer who occupied the flight deck jump seat. The first officer under line training was the pilot flying. The en route part of the flight was uneventful. The flight was descending for Schiphol and passed overhead Flevoland at about 8500 ft. At that time the aural landing gear warning sounded. The aircraft continued and was then directed by Air Traffic Control towards runway 18R for an ILS approach and landing. The standard procedure for runway 18R prescribes that the aircraft is lined up at least 8 NM from the runway threshold at an altitude of 2000 feet. The glidepath is then approached and intercepted from below. Lining up at a distance between 5 and 8 NM is allowed when permitted by ATC. Flight 1951 was vectored for a line up at approximately 6 NM at an altitude of 2000 feet. The glide slope was now approached from above. The crew performed the approach with one of the two autopilot and autothrottle engaged. The landing gear was selected down and flaps 15 were set. While descending through 1950 feet, the radio altimeter value suddenly changed to -8 feet. And again the aural landing gear warning sounded. This could be seen on the captain’s (left-hand) primary flight display. The first officer’s (right-hand) primary flight display, by contrast, indicated the correct height, as provided by the right-hand system. The left hand radio altimeter system, however, categorised the erroneous altitude reading as a correct one, and did not record any error. In turn, this meant that it was the erroneous altitude reading that was used by various aircraft systems, including the autothrottle. The crew were unaware of this, and could not have known about it. The manuals for use during the flight did not contain any procedures for errors in the radio altimeter system. In addition, the training that the pilots had undergone did not include any detailed system information that would have allowed them to understand the significance of the problem. When the aircraft started to follow the glidepath because of the incorrect altitude reading, the autothrottle moved into the ‘retard flare’ mode. This mode is normally only activated in the final phase of the landing, below 27 feet. This was possible because the other preconditions had also been met, including flaps at (minimum) position 15. The thrust from both engines was accordingly reduced to a minimum value (approach idle). This mode was shown on the primary flight displays as ‘RETARD’. However, the right-hand autopilot, which was activated, was receiving the correct altitude from the right-hand radio altimeter system. Thus the autopilot attempted to keep the aircraft flying on the glide path for as long as possible. This meant that the aircraft’s nose continued to rise, creating an increasing angle of attack of the wings. This was necessary in order to maintain the same lift as the airspeed reduced. In the first instance, the pilots’ only indication that the autothrottle would no longer maintain the pre-selected speed of 144 knots was the RETARD display. When the speed fell below this value at a height of 750 feet, they would have been able to see this on the airspeed indicator on the primary flight displays. When subsequently, the airspeed reached 126 knots, the frame of the airspeed indicator also changed colour and started to flash. The artificial horizon also showed that the nose attitude of the aircraft was becoming far too high. The cockpit crew did not respond to these indications and warnings. The reduction in speed and excessively high pitch attitude of the aircraft were not recognised until the approach to stall warning (stick shaker) went off at an altitude of 460 feet. The first officer responded immediately to the stick shaker by pushing the control column forward and also pushing the throttle levers forward. The captain however, also responded to the stick shaker commencing by taking over control. Assumingly the result of this was that the first officer’s selection of thrust was interrupted. The result of this was that the autothrottle, which was not yet switched off, immediately pulled the throttle levers back again to the position where the engines were not providing any significant thrust. Once the captain had taken over control, the autothrottle was disconnected, but no thrust was selected at that point. Nine seconds after the commencement of the first approach to stall warning, the throttle levers were pushed fully forward, but at that point the aircraft had already stalled and the height remaining, of about 350 feet, was insufficient for a recovery. According to the last recorded data of the digital flight data recorder the aircraft was in a 22° ANU and 10° Left Wing Down (LWD) position at the moment of impact. The airplane impacted farmland. The horizontal stabilizer and both main landing gear legs were separated from the aircraft and located near the initial impact point. The left and right engines had detached from the aircraft. The aft fuselage, with vertical stabilizer, was broken circumferentially forward of the aft passenger doors and had sustained significant damage. The fuselage had ruptured at the right side forward of the wings. The forward fuselage section, which contained the cockpit and seat rows 1 to 7, had been significantly disrupted. The rear fuselage section was broken circumferentially around row 28.

Avro RJ100

On final approach to Diyarbakir Airport by night, the crew encountered marginal weather conditions with local patches of fog and limited visibility. On short final, in a slight nose down attitude, the aircraft struck the ground and crashed 900 metres short of runway 34, bursting into flames. Five passengers were seriously injured while 75 other occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, the crew was completing a VOR/DME approach to runway 34 that was not equipped with an ILS.

Avro RJ70

Following an uneventful flight from Ankara, the aircraft landed at Siirt Airport runway 24/06 which is 1,660 metres long. After touchdown on a wet runway, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance, overran and came to rest few dozen metres further. All 46 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. All conditions were not met for a safe landing and the braking action was moderate to poor. Aquaplaning was suspected.

Avro RJ100

On approach to runway 21, the crew encountered poor weather conditions and limited visibility. unable to establish a visual contact with the runway, the captain decided to initiate a go-around procedure. While on a second approach to runway 03 which is 1,620 metres long, the aircraft was too high on the glide and landed about half way down the runway. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, it overran, lost its undercarriage and collided with an earth mound located 67 metres past the runway end. All 74 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Boeing 737-400

While descending to Van-Ferit Melen Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with a limited visibility due to heavy snow falls. While on a VOR/DME approach to runway 03, the crew was unable to establish a visual contact with the runway and decided to initiate a go-around. Due to general conditions at destination, the captain decided to return to Ankara but eventually attempted a second approach. Few minutes later, as the visibility dropped to 300 metres, the crew was forced to initiate a second go-around. During the third approach, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the aircraft struck a snow covered hill (70 metres high) located about 4 km from runway 03 threshold and crashed. Five crew members and 52 passengers were killed while 19 other occupants were seriously injured. The aircraft was destroyed. At the time of the accident, the visibility was below minimums.

Boeing 727-200

On final approach to Ankara-Esenboga Airport by night, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with snow falls. On short final, the three engine airplane struck the ground 50 meters short of runway and crashed, bursting into flames. Twenty occupants were injured while 47 passengers were killed.

Boeing 727-200

The airplane departed Istanbul-Yesilköy Airport at 2245LT on a scheduled flight to Antalya, carrying 146 passengers and a crew of eight. After passing over the Afyon VOR at an altitude of 25,000 feet, the crew requested the permission to descend to 13,000 feet. A 2311LT, the captain reported Antalya city lights in sight and started the descent to runway 36. At this time, the real position of the aircraft was about 100 km north of Antalya. Four minutes later, while descending by night under VFR mode at an altitude of 3,700 feet, the airplane struck the slope of Mt Karakaya (1,371 metres high) located south of Isparta. The airplane disintegrated on impact and debris were found at an altitude of 1,130 metres. All 154 occupants were killed.